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ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

Nature of the Case

This case presents the Court with a dilemma: In the face of scientific evidence, i.e., blood
tests that were negative for the presence of active intoxicating substances, can a trier of fact
convict a defendant of the crime of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Drugs, or Other
Intoxicating Substances (DUI)? Both the magistrate court, sitting as the trier of fact, and the
district court, sitting as an appellate review court, affirmed a verdict of guilt. Mr. Stark, the
defendant whose breath and blood tests were negative for alcohol or intoxicating substances,
contends that there is no substantial competent evidence in the record to overcome negative
blood and breath tests which conclusively show the absence of alcohol or intoxicating substances
at the time Mr. Stark was driving. His conviction should be overturned.

II.

Course of Proceedings
On July 8, 2010, the Defendant/Appellant Geirrod D. Stark, was arrested for (DUI).

Idaho Code §18-8004. A court trial was held on October 20,2012, and despite: (1) a BAC level
of 0.0, (2) no evidence of recent ingestion of drugs or intoxicating substances, and (3) a blood
test result with no evidence of drugs that could have been intoxicating, the court found Mr. Stark
guilt of DUI. Tr. p. 81. In ruling, the court noted that "certainly there is a question" as to
whether Mr. Stark was under the influence of drugs. Tr. p. 82. Instead of reaching a finding of
innocent due to the presence of reasonable doubt, the trial court found that the impairment was
due to the ingestion of drugs. Id. A judgment of conviction was entered. R. p. 39. Mr. Stark was
sentenced to incarceration for 60 days. Tr. p. 90. On December 2, 2010, Mr. Stark sought
reconsideration, and on December 22, 2010 the trial court granted reconsideration and reduced
the incarceration to 20 days (with credit for time served) and supervised probation. R., p. 48-50.
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On December 9, 2010, Mr. Stark filed a Motion Staying Execution of Sentence Pending Appeal
and also filed a timely Notice of Appeal. R. p. 44.
III.

Statement of Facts

On July 8, 2010, a police officer stopped a vehicle which had made an illegal right hand
tum and proceeded the wrong way on a one way street. Tr. p. 11, Ll. 10-13; p. 30, Ll. 22-25.
The officer had not seen any erratic driving, weaving, speeding, or other behavior, other than the
actions described above. Tr. p. 30, Ll. 16-25. After stopping the vehicle, the police officer
observed ambiguous, unexplained behavior from Mr. Stark, the driver. He described this
behavior as: (1) refusal to look at the officer; (2) swearing and telling the officer to go away and
quit harassing him; (3) staring downward with hands on the steering wheel; (4) giving one word
answers to questions; (5) exhibiting an uncooperative attitude; (5) dropping his head to his chest
and bobbing his head around; and (6) appeared dazed and apparently unable to keep his eyes
open. Tr. p. 13, Ll. 1-16. 19-25; p. 12, Ll. 3-5; p.l4, Ll. 7-16; p. 15, Ll. 9-17,25; p. 16, L. 8.
However, the officer did not smell any alcohol on Mr. Stark. Tr. p. 16, L. 8.
Mr. Stark did fail the field sobriety tests, so he was handcuffed and taken to jail. Tr. p.
17-19. The officer had Mr. Stark blow into an Itoxilyzer breath machine, even though he had no
objective reason to believe he was under the influence of alcohol, and had in fact concluded that
Mr. Stark was acting this way for unexplained reasons, and not because of alcohol intoxication.
Tr. p. 24; p. 25, Ll. 1-14. The officer admitted under oath that the only reason for requiring Mr.
Stark to take this test was that it was "protocol." rd. Results of the breath test were 0.0. Tr. p.
25, L. 1.

The officer suspected that the reason for Mr. Stark's erratic behavior was the presence of
intoxicating drugs, so he ordered a blood test to detect the presence of intoxicating substances.
Results of the blood test showed no presence of intoxicating drugs of any kind, no presence
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of any level of the psychotropic medications Stark admitted he had taken five days before,
and no presence of THC, the active ingredient that would have been present had Stark
smoked marijuana on the day he was driving. R. Ex. 1. The only positive result was the
presence of Carboxy-THC, which is not an active ingredient of marijuana, and thus not an
intoxicating substance. Id.
Mr. Stark presented abundant evidence at trial of the reasons for his erratic behavior and
failed sobriety tests, evidence which was not rebutted or challenged by the prosecution. He told
the officer at the time of the traffic stop that he had a lazy eye, Tr. p. 55 Ll. 19-23, pp. 56-57,
which might contribute to failing the eye testing done at the scene. Tr. p. 18, Ll. 1-6. Mr. Stark
explained that it was hot outside and he was hungry, dehydrated, thirsty, and needed gas, and that
Officer Ellis was confusing him. Tr. p. 59, Ll. 7-15. Stark explained that he was irritated
because all he wanted to do was put gas in his vehicle. Tr. p. 59, Ll. 22-25, p. 60, Ll. 1-2. At
trial, Mr. Stark tried to explain why he acted the way he did:
I don't ... I feel I was paying very good attention. I don't agree with that statement that I
wasn't paying attention. I was doing everything he said. He told me to lay on the ground;
I laid on the ground. He told me to lift my legs up; I lifted my legs up. I was laying there
with my hands behind my back. I did everything they asked me to do just like they asked
me to do, and eventually it wasn't good enough for them, so whatever ... "

Tr. p. 55, Ll. 2-11.

Mr. Stark gave a sad history of medical issues and mental problems that he had
experienced in his life. Mr. Stark also described suffering from the effects of a brain aneurysm
while stationed in the military in Korea at age 19. Tr. p. 41, Ll. 19-24. The evidence presented
by Mr. Stark related a lifetime of grave mental and physical problems, voluntary and forced
hospitalizations. He admitted that he had been treated for mental problems, including paranoid
delusions at this young age. Tr. pp. 38-39, p. 41, L. 15. He hadn't been healthy enough to work
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since his discharge from the service in 2003 and he survived on a 100% service-related
disability. Tr. p. 42, L. 25, p. 43, Ll. 1-11. He has been diagnosed as a schizophrenic with
delusions. Tr. p. 41, L. 15.
Mr. Stark's most recent hospitalization prior to his arrest was from May 11 through May
12,2010, when he was involuntarily transferred to Intermountain Hospital. Tr. p. 47, Ll. 7-11.
On May 19,2010 he was transferred to Orofino. He was released from Orofino on July 3, 2010.
Tr. p. 48, Ll. 11-21. While at the State Hospital, doctors gave Stark a variety of psychotropic
medications, including Lithium, Risperdal, Thorazine and Klonopin. Tr. p. 62. However, in the
five days from his discharge from State Hospital on July 3rd and July 8th when he was arrested,
he had not taken any kind of medication. Tr. p. 49, Ll. 4-7, 24-25. In fact, he testified that he
felt better. Tr. p. 63, Ll. 14-19. He did not admit to smoking any marijuana after his discharge
from Orofino. Tr. p. 64, Ll. 1-5.
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Issues Presented on Appeal

Did the trial court err in finding Mr. Stark guilty of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol,
Drugs or Intoxicating Substances when breath and blood tests conclusively proved that there
were no intoxicating substances in the Defendant's system at the time he was driving?

When the State chooses to rely upon the presence of a substance that is not intoxicating in and of
itself, to prove guilt of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Drugs or Intoxicating
Substances, is expert testimony required to establish substantial, competent evidence of
intoxicating substances and their connection to impairment, which was absent in this case?
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ARGUMENT
I. The Trial Court Erred in Finding Guilt In the Absence of Substantial, Competent
Evidence to Support a Finding of the Presence of Intoxicating Substances.
Count I charged the Defendant Geirrod Stark (hereinafter Mr. Stark) with driving while
under the influence of drugs or an intoxicating substance, as shown by an analysis of blood,
which is in violation ofIdaho Code § 18-8004(1 )(a). R. p. 31-32 .
The complaint in this case charged Mr. Stark with impairment by virtue of blood tests. R. p.
32. One way that the State can prove a violation ofIdaho Code § 18-8004(l)(a) is to produce
evidence of blood tests that indicate the ingestion of intoxicating substances at the time of the
driving offense. The blood tests in this case were negative for the presence of drugs. There was
no evidence of any drug in Mr. Stark's blood stream. The only evidence of any substance in Mr.
Stark's blood was the presence of Carboxy-THC, which is NOT THC, the psychoactive
component of marijuana. The existence ofCarboxy-THC in Mr. Stark's blood indicated that Mr.
Stark had at some point in his life smoked Marijuana, but is not indicative of the presence of any
intoxicant, psychoactive drug, or any impairment whatsoever. See, Reisenauer v. State, Dept. of
Transp., 145 Idaho 948,188 P.3d 890 (Idaho 2008). The blood test did not reveal any
substances in Mr. Stark's system that could be deemed intoxicating, including the drugs that Mr.
Stark had taken in Orofino at least five days before his arrest.
If this case were before the court on a conviction of dri ving under the influence of alcohol,
and the evidence included a test result with a blood alcohol level of 0.0, the court would quickly
dismiss the case, because the State's own scientific evidence would have proven conclusively
that the defendant was NOT guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol. This would be true
even ifthere were evidence of erratic, uncooperative behavior, beer bottles in the car, etc., some
ofthe evidence the State relied upon in this case. If the trier of fact had found the defendant
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guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol in the face of a negative test, this Court should
have no trouble finding that there was no substantial, competent evidence to support a verdict of
guilty here.
The same is true when there is a blood test that is negative for the presence of any active,
intoxicating drugs. The blood test in this case did not reveal the presence in Mr. Stark's blood of
any intoxicating substances. In the face of this positive proof that Mr. Stark was not driving
under the influence of intoxicating drugs, the State sought to rely upon the fact that the defendant
merely "looked guilty" to argue that he must have done something wrong.
There is no other case in our system of criminal justice where a court found the defendant
guilty, and the verdict was upheld on appeal, where the defendant merely "looked guilty" or
"acted guilty." A defendant would not be found guilty of murder ifhe merely "acted guilty."
There are too many possible explanations for the type of behavior noted in this case, and the
presence of other rational explanations require the conclusion that there is a reasonable doubt as
to guilt.
The District Court, sitting as an appellate tribunal, relied upon case law requiring the trial
court verdict to be affirmed when it is based upon reasonable inferences, with the facts construed
in favor of the verdict. R. p. 175-177. See State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 648, 181 P. 3d 1249,
1256 eCt. App. 2008). The problem with drawing inferences of the presence of intoxicating
substances in this case is the existence of positive proof that no such substances were in Mr.
Stark's system at the time he was driving. A court cannot convict someone of a crime in the face
of positive proof that no crime was committed, merely on the assumption that the defendant must
have done something wrong, because he looked or acted guilty.
The Assistant City Prosecutor summarized his frustration in his own argument, and
admitted the absence of adequate proof, by arguing only that the defendant "knew what he had
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done was wrong" because he would not make eye contact, and was not cooperating. Tr. p. 71.
The prosecutor thus admitted that the State did not have the proof needed to tie any tests or
behavior to the presence of intoxicating substances in Mr. Stark. The prosecutor argued that it
was "possible" that there were some effects of the remote use of Orofino medication still in Mr.
Stark's blood stream, even in the absence of any medical testimony about that possibility, or in
the absence of a positive blood test for the presence of those medications. Tr. p. 70, Ll. 13-16.
The State's case invited the court to "guess" at whether the intoxicating substance was marijuana
or another intoxicating substance. Tr. p. 71.
Even the trial court raised a question, indicating he did not know what intoxicating
substance Stark was under the influence of. "Mr. Stark was impaired, he was under the influence
of something. And the question becomes then, what? And my view of the evidence in this case
is that although there certainly is a question, I'm satisfied that the State has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that the impairment was due to the ingestion of drugs." Tr. p. 62, Ll. 11-18.
The trier of fact, in this case the magistrate court, admitted in this finding that there was no way
to determine if Mr. Stark was under the influence of any particular intoxicating substance. Tr. p.
82.
In the face of a blood test which revealed the presence of no intoxicating substances, to
conclude guilt based upon "guessing" that Mr. Stark was under the influence is clear error. Mr.
Stark was not charged with reckless driving, or another crime that might fit under these
circumstances. He was charged with driving under the influence of an intoxicating substance. A
judgment of conviction must be overturned on appeal where the state did not produce admissible
evidence upon which the trier of fact could have found that the state sustained its burden of
proving the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cortez, 135 Idaho
561,562,21 P.3d 498,499 (Ct.App. 2001). With a negative blood test, the trier of fact could
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not have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and this Court must overturn the trial court's
verdict. State v. Anderson, 175 P.3d 788, 792 (Idaho 2008).

II. Under These Circumstances, Expert Testimony Was Required to Provide Substantial
Competent Evidence Concerning Whether a Substance is "Intoxicating" and in the
Absence of Such Testimony, the Verdict is not Supported by Substantial Competent
Evidence.
The forensic laboratory report of Mr. Stark's blood sample revealed the presence of only
Carboxy-THC, and no intoxicating substances or drugs, including THC, the active ingredient in
marijuana. Tr. p. 27, L1. 22-25 - p. 28,L1. 1-3). Police Officer Ellis (hereinafter Officer Ellis)
testified, without objection, that based upon his training and experience that marijuana contains
the chemical Carboxy-THC. I At the time he confronted Mr. Stark, Officer Ellis had been
employed by the Boise Police Department for only 13 months. Tr. p. 8, L1. 20-23. When he
encountered Mr. Stark, Officer Ellis was accompanied by a field training officer named
Schneider. Tr. p. 10, 11. 12-22. His DUI drug training experience consisted of only some police
academy classes and "a DUI class basically talking about the effects of alcohol and drugs on the
person; and to detect signs for those impairments and how to test for those" Tr. p. 9, 11. 1-18. He
also testified that as a patrol officer he encounters people he suspects of being under the
influence of alcohol or drugs at least weekly Id., L1. 15-22. There was no direct or crossexamination concerning any specifics of Officer Ellis' training concerning drugs and absolutely
no testimony whatsoever concerning Officer Ellis' training concerning intoxicating substances.
I The district court on appeal asserted that Mr. Stark could not raise the issue of whether Officer Ellis provided
competent evidence of the presence of marijuana in Mr. Stark's system. The court contended that this issue had not
been raised until the reply brief, and thus was waived. R., p.182. However, the sole issue on this appeal has always
been, and continues to be, whether there was substantial competent evidence to support the guilty verdict. When the
State continues to rely upon Officer Ellis as the sole support for their theory that intoxicating substances were
present, Mr. Stark must raise arguments to demonstrate why the evidence that the State relies upon does not
constitute the substantial competent evidence needed to support the verdict. See Idaho Appellate Rule
35(z)(4)(" ... statement of issues presented will be deemed to include every subsidiary issue fairly comprised
therein.")
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There was also no evidence adduced describing Officer Ellis' DUI arrests, broken down into the
categories of arrests for alcohol, drugs, or intoxicating substances.
Officer Ellis was simply not qualified to render any opinions concerning drugs and
intoxicating substances, or their effects on the human body relating to impaired driving. Any
implication that his testimony provided the substantial competent evidence to support a
conclusion of the presence of intoxicating substances is mere speculation.
Officer Ellis acknowledged his lack of expertise in the above areas when he admitted he
called for a drug recognition expert (DRE) after Mr. Stark's breath tests results showed "zero."
He stated that DREs have the expertise relating to detecting impairment caused by drugs that he
lacked. He testified as follows:
Q. Based on your association with the Boise Police Department, what does a drug
recognition person do? What is their purpose?
A. They are specifically trained and have expertise in detecting impairment due to
narcotics and different schedules of drugs. Tr. p. 25, 11.1-23. 2

2 The City of Boise adopted the DRE program in August of 1996. See
http:cityofboise.orgldepartments/police/aboutbpd/specializedunit, for a description of the City of Boise's DRE
program.
Boise's DRE program was patterned after the Los Angeles Police Department's Drug Evaluation Program.
Starting in 1984, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration developed a standardized curriculum for
training police officers as DREs and, utilizing this training, initiated DRE programs in many states.
The Washington Supreme Court in State v. Baity, 991 P.2d 1151 (2000), discussed the three phases of the
DRE program of instruction. The requirements are rigorous. The trainee must not only complete 72-hours of drug
education classes, they must also complete practical field training and pass a written examination. It is only after
completing these initial requirements that certification training begins. Certification training is also rigorous and
involves identifYing the various drug categories affecting an individual suspected of being impaired, a written
examination, and a demonstration of knowledge in a skills environment session conducted before two DRE certified
instructors. Additionally, DREs must be recertified every two years. To be recertified, a DRE must take additional
classes and pass additional evaluations. Baity, supra.
The Baity court stated that DREs are trained to "determine whether a driver is under the influence of drugs
and then to determine the type of drug causing the observable impairment." To determine whether a driver is under
the influence of a specific category of drugs other than alcohol, DREs use a 12 step procedure based on a variety of
observable signs and symptoms that are known to be reliable indicators of drug impairment. All DREs, regardless
of agency, use the same procedures, in the same order, on all drivers. The DRE's evaluation is based not on one
element, but on a totality of the evaluation. When in doubt, the DRE must find the driver is not under the influence.
Id.
Baity held that the above DRE protocol meets the requirements of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013
(1923), which governs the admission of evidence as being reliable and scientific.
In State v. McFarland, 191 P.3d 754 (Ore. App. 2008), Idaho's sister state held that the DRE protocol
results obtained by a DRE trained, but not yet certified, police officer was inadmissible. DRE training alone was
held to be insufficient absence the final certification.
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Due to Officer Ellis' lack of expertise and experience, it is clear he could offer no
competent evidence concerning the absence or presence of drugs or intoxicating substances and
whether Mr. Stark might be impaired by those substances. Even ifhe were qualified to render
such an opinion, his testimony that Carboxy-THC comes from marijuana was not evidence that
marijuana was present in Mr. Stark's blood or that he was impaired or under the influence of
marijuana at the time of his arrest. Officer Ellis never opined that Carboxy-THC is an
intoxicating substance or could cause impairment. Tr. P. 28 Ll. 3-6.
The prosecutor also argued that the defendant should be found guilty because he had not
submitted to an examination by a drug recognition expert. Tr. p. 71.
Had he possessed the necessary expertise, Officer Ellis would likely have been forced to
admit that Carboxy-THC is only a metabolite of marijuana and that it has no ability to impair a
motorist. The Idaho Supreme Court in Reisenauer v. State, Dept. o/Transp., 145 Idaho 948, 188
P .3d 890 (Idaho 2008) ruled that:
In the present case, the presence of Carboxy-THC only indicates that at some time in the
past a person used marijuana. Indeed, Carboxy-THC is not in and of itself a drug in any
event. It is only a metabolite of a drug. Its presence in a urine sample is not evidence of
the presence of any drug. Accordingly, there was not substantial competent evidence that
Mr. Reisenauer failed an evidentiary test for drugs. Cf. In Re: Driver's License
Suspension a/Van Camp, no. 37714 (Id. App. 2011).
The State, through Officer Ellis, its only witness, failed to introduce any substantial
competent evidence that marijuana was present in Mr. Stark's blood or that he had recently
ingested marijuana prior to driving. No marijuana or other drugs were found in or on Mr. Stark.
There was no odor of marijuana coming from Mr. Stark or his vehicle. There was a baggie, a

Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 et. seq., governs the admission of scientific evidence by experts in Idaho. No
expert testimony was adduced by the State or even attempted to be admitted, under this rule.
Idaho Appellate Courts have referenced DRE testing in DUI drug cases. See e.g., State v. Lesley, 133 Idaho 23,981
P.2d 748 (Ct. App. 1999). In Lesley, a certified police drug recognition expert administered a number of
examinations to determine whether Lesley had been driving under the influence of drugs.
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common household item used for many things, that appeared to be ripped, but which did not
contain any evidence of drugs. Tr. p. 24, Ll. 7-11; p. 34, Ll. 8-24. Mr. Stark was not charged
with possession of drug paraphernalia, nor was the baggie tested for the presence of any drug.
Id. Mr. Stark said he took nothing, whether drugs, marijuana or medication, within days before
he was arrested. Tr. p. 49.L1.4-7 and p. 63, Ll20-p. 64, L. 4.
There was some discussion that Mr. Stark received various medications while he was
hospitalized, ending July 3rd , or five days before his arrest. Tr. p. 48, L. 22-p. 49, L.7. However,
there was no substantial competent evidence introduced at trial that such medications were in
Mr. Stark's system at the time he was driving, or the effects of these medications on the human
body, whether they might impair a driver, etc.
With respect to drugs or intoxicating substances, the State proved through the
forensic blood test results that there were !!Q drugs or intoxicating substances in Mr.
Stark's blood at the time the blood sample was drawn. The test results were negative!
The State contended, and the trial court concluded, that Mr. Stark was impaired and that
his impairment must have been the result of drugs or intoxicating substances. However, there
was never any evidence introduced at trial with respect to the following:
1. Which drugs?
2. Which intoxicating substances?
3. How any drugs or intoxicating substances might have caused him to be
impaired?
There are many reasons why a motorist might be impaired; to wit: poor vision, poor
hearing, cell phones or other distractions, fatigue, mental illness, injuries, disabilities,
dehydration, heat exhaustion, etc. The presence of many of these factors was cited by Mr. Stark
to explain his poor driving and performance on the field sobriety tests.
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In its closing argument, the State appeared to concede its lack of evidence that Mr.
Stark's impairment was the result of drugs or intoxicating substances. The State admitted, inter
alia, as follows:
I guess the point I would make in this case ... there is not a drug recognition evaluator that
performed an evaluation. If there had been ... ifthe Defendant had submitted to that, then
we would be able to tie those two together (drugs and impairment). (Tr. p. 79, 11. 5-16).
It is clear that only a DRE is competent to determine whether a motorist is under the

influence of drugs or an intoxicating substance. Idaho courts should adopt a rule that DRE
testimony is required in cases such as this one, especially in the face of a negative blood test.

3

Absence such expert analysis and testimony, there is no substantial competent evidence
concerning whether a driver is under the influence of drugs or an intoxicating substance.
There is a vast difference in the competence ofDRE and Officer Ellis in determining
whether Mr. Stark was under the influence of drugs or an intoxicating substance. Officer Ellis
was simply not qualified to render any competent opinion concerning whether Mr. Stark was
impaired by drugs or intoxicating substances.
Mr. Stark's refusal to cooperate with the DRE does not excuse the State's failure to meet
its burden of proof in this case. A motorist is not required to submit to a DRE evaluation or even
perform field sobriety tests. A motorist is required to submit to breath tests if requested. Mr.
Stark took a breath test. He also agreed to a blood draw. See Idaho Code § 18-8002 for the
required tests.
The State had other options in light ofMr. Stark's refusal to submit to a DRE evaluation.
In his concurring opinion in Reisenauer, supra., Justice Jones opined that expert testimony might

3 Of course, Mr. Stark contends that the blood test is conclusive evidence of innocence, but in the event the court is
not convinced, he presents the argument that there is no substantial competent evidence to support a finding of
intoxication in this case without the presence ofDRE testimony.
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have been able to extrapolate back to the time of the alleged offense to show that an intoxicating
substance was present at the time of the alleged offense in a motorist's system.
The State of Idaho might have been able to pursue that option in the present case.
Office Ellis also could have immediately called for a DRE evaluation at the arrest site
after he determined that alcohol was not involved.
The State chose not to pursue either of the above options.
The complete absence of any evidence that any drugs were present in Mr. Stark's
system, and that any impairment in his driving resulted from drugs or intoxicating substances,
requires a reversal of his conviction and the vacation of his sentence.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF -14

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, there was no substantial competent evidence to
prove an essential element of the case against Mr. Stark: the presence of drugs or intoxicating
substances, or that any impairment was the result of drugs or intoxicating substances.
Accordingly, Mr. Stark's DUI drug conviction must be reversed and his sentence vacated. The
State failed to prove its case by substantial, competent evidence and the lower court's decision of
guilt must be set aside by reversal of the conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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